Abstract. Insofar as empirical inquiry involves the coevolution of descriptive language and theoretical commitments, a satisfactory model of empirical knowledge should describe the coordinated evolution of both language and theory. But since we do not know what conceptual resources we might need to express our future theories or to provide our best future faithful descriptions of the world, we do not now know even what the space of future descriptive options might be. One strategy for addressing this shifting-resource problem is to track the predictive and linguistic dispositions of inquirers rather than their theories and conceptual resources. Sender-predictor games, a variant of Skyrms-Lewis sender-receiver games, provide very simple models for the coordinated coevolution of predictive and linguistic dispositions. Such models explain how it is possible for (1) predictive and descriptive dispositions of inquirers to coevolve, (2) term-wise incommensurable, but nevertheless descriptively faithful languages, to sequentially evolve, and (3) a sort of underdetermination to occur where inquirers might satisfy their descriptive and predictive aims by revising their linguistic dispositions, their theoretical dispositions, or both. Such models also provide an elementary characterization of what it might mean for descriptions of the world to be faithful and for empirical inquiry to be successful. In doing so they provide a relatively weak, but perfectly clear, endogenous account of epistemic norms.
Rather than try to characterize the space of possible future conceptual options, one might endeavor to track inquiry by considering how inquirers' descriptive, predictive, and explanatory dispositions coevolve. But even if one accepts the suitability of tracking conceptual resources by tracking the dispositions of inquirers, there remains a serious problem here of feasibility. Providing a fine-grained account of the evolution of the dispositions of real inquirers would be extraordinarily difficult, perhaps simply impossible. That said, one might model the coevolution of such interrelated dispositions for very simple, highly idealized inquirers. The thought is that such simple models might provide an elementary understanding of how it is possible for descriptive and theoretical resources to coevolve. And, along the way, one might gain some degree of insight into how best to understand epistemic norms in the context of such dispositional models. Such an account will be as thin as such models are over-simplified, but insofar as the account is clear, it might nevertheless represent significant progress in our understanding of inquiry and its norms.
This paper is concerned with showing how descriptive and predictive dispositions might coevolve in the context of sender-predictor games with bounded reinforcement learning with punishment. Such games allow one to explain how it is possible for (1) the descriptive and predictive dispositions of inquirers to coevolve with relatively few resources, (2) term-wise incommensurable, but nevertheless descriptively faithful languages, to sequentially evolve, and (3) a sort of underdetermination to occur where inquirers might satisfy their descriptive and predictive aims by revising their linguistic dispositions, theoretical dispositions, or both. Such models also provide a very basic characterization of what it might mean for descriptions of the world to be considered faithful and empirical inquiry to be understood as successful. In doing so they provide an endogenous account of epistemic norms. While this account is very simple and relatively weak, it is at least perfectly clear.
Sender-predictor games
Sender-predictor games provide elementary models for the coevolution of descriptive and predictive dispositions. Sender-predictor games are variants of SkyrmsLewis sender-receiver games. 2 here is that the shifting-resource problem is a problem for anyone who wishes to provide a concrete model of inquiry insofar as such a model may require one to characterize future conceptual options. 2 For discussions of standard Skyrms-Lewis sender-receiver games and variants see [12] , [16] , [9] , [1] , [8] , [7] , [5] , and [15] ). The idea of a sender-predictor game came from conversations with Michael Dickson. Dickson has subsequently studied sender-predictor games that are significantly more subtle than those described here. Of particular interest are models where the laws of nature are not deterministic. In such models, assuming a simple learning dynamics for the agents that
In the most basic standard Skyrms-Lewis sender-receiver game there are two agents: a sender and a receiver. The sender observes the state of nature, then sends an signal. The receiver observes the signal then performs an action that either matches the state of nature and is successful or does not match the state of nature and is unsuccessful. If the act is successful, then the disposition that led to each agent's last action is reinforced; otherwise, it may be weakened. Indeed, a successful action here is simply an action that generates a result that in fact leads to the reinforcement of those dispositions that produced the action (insofar as the learning dynamics allows for these dispositions to be further reinforced), and an unsuccessful action is an action that generates a result that does not lead to the reinforcement of the dispositions that led to the action (and, insofar as the learning dynamics allows, may lead to the weakening of these dispositions ).
On such a game, the sender's signals are initially meaningless, but as her dispositions to signal conditional on the state of nature and the receiver's dispositions to act conditional on the signal evolve, the sender's signals become meaningful insofar as they serve as the basis for successful coordinated action. Whether a perfectly successful signaling system evolves in such a game depends on the number and distribution of states of nature, the agents' signaling resources, and the precise learning dynamics one considers.
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Similarly, in the most basic sender-predictor game, the sender observes the prior state of nature, then sends a signal. On receiving the signal, the receiver then performs a predictive action that is either successful or unsuccessful depending on the posterior state of nature at a later time. The sender might, for example, observe the color of the morning sunrise, then clap once or twice. On hearing the signal, the receiver might either prepare for a picnic outside or a lunch indoors for their afternoon meal. If this predictive act is successful, that is, say, if the inquirers end up either picnicking outside in the sun or lunching indoors warm and dry while watching the rain through a window, then the disposition that led to the sender's signal and the disposition that led to the receiver's action is reinforced; otherwise these dispositions might be weakened. Since only the sender sees the morning sunrise and since the weather in the afternoon in part determines the success of closely resembles the dynamics described below, the agents are typically able to successfully evolve a descriptive language and successfully predict the most likely evolution of nature. We expect to describe these models in a future co-written paper.
3 See [12] for the original description of signaling games in the context of traditional game theory. See [15] , [1] , [13] , [5] , and [9] for descriptions of the basic game and variations in the context of evolutionary game theory and for discussions of conditions under which successful signaling might evolve.
on the coevolution of theory and language and the nature of successful inquiry 5 the receiver's predictive action, the sender and receiver must coevolve dispositions that are reliable both in signaling prior states of nature and in predicting posterior states of nature in order to be successful. But, again, that an action is described as successful here means nothing more than that the dispositions of the inquirers that lead to the action are in fact reinforced given the actual result of the action.
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In discussing such models it is useful to distinguish between the inquirers' firstand second-order dispositions. The sender's and receiver's dispositions to signal and to act may be thought of as their first-order dispositions. In contrast, their secondorder dispositions are their dispositions to update their first-order dispositions on the basis of the actual results of their descriptive and predictive actions. The inquirers' second-order dispositions, then, determine how they learn from experience.
The suggestion will be that they may also be taken to provide an endogenous notion of what it means for an action to be successful in the context of the model. But we will return to this point later.
A slightly more complicated sender-predictor game is represented in Figure 1 below. Here there are four prior states of nature, four signals the sender might use, and four possible predictive actions for the receiver. We will suppose that the inquirers learn using bounded reinforcement with punishment. On this sort of learning dynamics, the inquirers' first-order dispositions may be thought of as The receiver has one urn for each type of signal. Each of his urns begins with one 4 If the dynamics of nature is deterministic, the sender-predictor game will be formally equivalent to a sender-receiver game with the same overall structure. That the same game can be interpreted two very different ways, as a game involving the evolution of language for successful coordinated action or as a game involving the evolution of language and successful prediction, is evidence for how closely intertwined the evolution of language and theory may be. That the same model might be plausibly interpreted multiple ways indicates that the domains of the different interpretations may in fact exhibit the common structure represented by the model. This line of argument is a recurring theme in this paper. Note, however, that if the dynamics in nature is not deterministic, the sender-predictor game has no standard sender-receiver counterpart (unless one considers, for example, sender-receiver games with noise or where the right action is randomly determined as might be the case if the sender and receiver were cooperating to play mixed strategies in a game against other agents).
ball of each type of predictive action he might take labeled 0, 1, 2, and 3. The sender observes the prior state of nature, draws a ball at random out of the corresponding urn, with each ball equally likely, then sends the corresponding signal. The receiver observes the signal, draws a ball at random out of the urn corresponding to the signal, with each ball equally likely, then performs whatever predictive action is indicated on the ball drawn.
To stipulate that the inquirers learn by bounded reinforcement with punishment is to endow them with second-order dispositions of a particular sort. More specifically, if the receiver's predictive action was successful, then the sender and receiver put the ball they drew back in the urn they drew it from and add to that urn another ball of the same type if there are fewer than N max balls of that type already in the urn. If the predictive action was unsuccessful, then they each put back the ball they drew if and only if it was the last ball of its type, which will typically weaken the associated dispositions. Given these second-order dispositions, there will always be at least one ball of each type in each urn, and never more than N max balls of any particular type. In this model the sender and receiver begin by randomly signaling and randomly predicting. Any initial success they have is consequently the result of blind luck.
As their first-order dispositions evolve under the influence of their second-order dispositions, however, the sender and receiver are found on simulation nearly always to evolve a set of nearly optimally successful, and systematically interrelated, descriptive and predictive dispositions. Since only the sender observes the prior state of nature, the receiver acts for both agents, and the success of the receiver's action is in part determined by the posterior state of nature, the inquirers must evolve both dispositions to faithfully represent the prior states of nature and dispositions to reliably predict posterior states in order to be successful. Put another way, to be successful, the inquirers must evolve a language sufficient to represent the states of nature, use this language to truthfully describe nature, and learn the patterns of nature with sufficient precision to take advantage of these patterns for the sake of predictive action. Whenever they do so, their first-order dispositions evolve in such a way that they are stable given their second-order dispositions. Their first-order dispositions then code for a sort of practical knowledge that allows the inquirers to satisfy the norms represented by their second-order dispositions.
In addition to showing how it is possible for very simple inquirers to evolve the ability to faithful describe and predict states of nature, this model also shows how closely intertwined these dispositions may be. Indeed, they are so closely intertwined in this particular model that the shared ability of the inquirers to reliably signal and predict might be described equally well as (1) There are a number of natural generalizations of such basic sender-predictor games. Consider, for example, a game involving two senders, each of which fails to have the resources to fully specify the prior state of nature as a signal to the receiver. Each sender observes the prior state of nature, then sends a signal as
(ii) no type of signal or predictive action ever go to extinction in any urn (so there is always a possible escape from suboptimal dispositions), and (iii) both reinforcement and punishment, or weakening, of first-order disquisitions be possible (since without reinforcement, the inquirers would be unable to learn; and without punishment they would be unable to forget suboptimal dispositions and hence lack the means of escape). On such a learning dynamics it is possible for the inquirers' first-order dispositions to randomly wander away from success, but they will quickly return and spend most of their time almost ideally successful in their actions. See [10] for a discussion on the role of forgetting in evolutionary games.
6 A yet richer game, in the relevant sense, would be one where the same term is sometimes used to promote present action and sometimes used to promote future action. If the two uses of the same term are assumed to be synonymous, such a game would allow one to determine who is describing prior states and who is predicting future states in a sharper sense than the games below. Here, again, the senders and receiver start off randomly signaling and randomly acting, but, as they learn from experience, they typically evolve a set of nearly optimal, systematically interrelated, linguistic and predictive dispositions. The game is the same as the last except that the inquirers change how they update their first-order dispositions after they have initially evolved a set of successful descriptive and predictive dispositions. More precisely, in the first stage of this game, the inquirers evolve successful descriptive and predictive dispositions just as described in the last game; then, in the second stage of this game, the inquirers begin to reinforce posterior action 2 on prior state 1 and posterior action 1 on prior state 2 and weaken the dispositions associated with any other actions involving these states. Again, this change in how the agents reinforce may reflect either changes in the regularities of nature or changes in the agents' norms, or both.
As before, the inquirers typically evolve successful descriptive and predictive dispositions in the first stage of the game; more to the point here, in the second stage of the game, they typically also adapt to the new reinforcements and evolve 8 The language that evolves in this game is similar to the simple compositional language used by putty-nosed monkeys. See [2] and [3] . For a discussion of the evolution of natural kind terms see [7] . a second set of nearly optimally successful descriptive and predictive dispositions.
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But it is underdetermined precisely how the modeled inquirers will evolve the new set of dispositions. The receiver may evolve to make predictions differently or, less frequently, the two senders may evolve new coordinated partitions that classify the states of nature differently.
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When the senders evolve a new descriptive language, their old and new languages are often incommensurable in the sense that they are not term-by-term intertranslatable. The term-wise incommensurability of their languages does not, however, represent any failure in their ability to faithfully describe the world they inhabit.
While the model of inquiry here is simple and idealized, this point nevertheless entails a quite general philosophical moral: that a particular model of inquiry may lead to incommensurable ways of describing the world cannot in itself be taken as providing any evidence whatsoever for the skeptical conclusion that inquiry on that model is not tracking descriptive truth. If they were unable to evolve the ability to faithfully represent prior states and to reliably predict posterior states, the inquirers could not ultimately evolve to be uniformly successful in action. Of course, this does not mean that the inquirers have the resources to characterize the precise senses in which their descriptions of the world are and are not faithful. 9 For parameters akin to those described in the last two games, the inquirers here typically (0.972) evolve a second set of nearly optimal (0.993) descriptive and predictive dispositions that answer to the new regularities of nature and/or changed second-order dispositions.
In simulations of the game as described here, the receiver evolved to make predictions differently with probability 0.581 and the senders evolved new coordinated partitions that classify the states of nature differently with probability 0.419. This lack of symmetry is interesting. Here it may be the result of the fact that it is harder for the senders to evolve a new coordinated language than for the receiver to evolve a new way of making predictions.
In order to better understand the sort of term-wise incommensurability exhibited here and how it might evolve, consider two concrete cases from two simulated runs of this game. In Case I, as represented in Figure 4 , it is the receiver who has evolved the new dispositions. The senders still associate the same terms with the same prior states of nature, but the receiver has changed how he makes predictive actions on the senders' signals. in Figure 6 , B 1 means the same thing in both languages, but no term in the old language translates the new term A 0 .
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The sort of termwise incommensurability exhibited here is relative tame. Since the agents can, in full statements, individuate precisely the same states of nature, while they lack the ability to translate terms between languages, they can translate statements. More subtle types of incommensurability, however, may evolve in such games. See, for example, [5] for a discussion of the sort of incommensurability that may be exhibited between languages corresponding to different partial pooling equilibria. In this case, there is neither term-wise not statement-wise commensurability between the evolved languages. Further, while the agents cannot individuate precisely the same states in such a case, their descriptions of the world may nevertheless be equally faithful insofar as they may allow for equally faithful overall precision in description. That either the senders or the receiver might revise their dispositions in order to answer to the new reinforcements illustrates again how closely intertwined descriptive and predictive dispositions may be on such models and how each sort of disposition is necessarily involved in successful action. Insofar as such models show how it is possible for equally faithful but incommensurable language to evolve in turn, they also show why even the possibility of strong incommensurability in description is not in itself evidence against our ability to faithfully describe nature.
While successful inquiry here consists in nothing more or less than the establishment of an appropriate harmony between nature and the second-order dispositions of the inquirers, this harmony cannot be established without the inquirers in fact evolving the ability to faithfully represent prior states of nature and reliably predict posterior states of nature.
An Endogenous Notion of Epistemic Norms
Sender-predictor games allow one to explain how it is possible for (1) descriptive and predictive dispositions to coevolve (and to coevolve in such a way as to accommodate changes in nature or in the inquirers' second-order dispositions), (2) term-wise incommensurable, but nevertheless descriptively faithful languages, to evolve in turn and (3) which their descriptions may or may not be faithful need not be something that the inquirers themselves can even express in their language as it stands at any given time. Indeed, insofar as the inquirers believe that their best future descriptions of the world will require descriptive resources that they do not yet possess, they will also believe that they cannot characterize how their current best descriptions fail.
predictions in the successful actions they make that are based on these descriptions and predictions.
Successful inquiry in the sense exhibited by sender-predictor games simply requires that the inquirers' first-order dispositions evolve in such a way that their second-order dispositions are well coordinated with what in fact happens when they act. While this is a relatively weak account of epistemic norms, it does require that the inquirers in fact evolve the ability to faithfully describe and reliably predict states of the world they inhabit. And it may not differ in kind from yet-tobe-described stronger accounts of epistemic norms. The thought is that stronger notions may be found, just as the present relatively weak notion was found, in the context of more detailed and subtle evolutionary models of inquiry, perhaps models that include the evolution of explanatory dispositions.
Conclusion
The shifting-resource problem requires that we understand knowledge in a way that allows for the coevolution of descriptive language and theory. Sender-predictor games allow one to explain how it is possible for descriptive and theoretical dispositions to coevolve to meet the shifting demands of inquiry without requiring an a priori or canonical space of linguistic or conceptual options. They also allow one to explain how incommensurable, but similarly faithful descriptions of nature may evolve in turn. Finally, such models provide a basic characterization of what it might mean to provide faithful descriptions of the world and reliable predictions, and, hence, what it might mean for empirical inquiry to be successful. In doing so, they provide a relatively weak, but perfectly clear and fully endogenous, account of epistemic norms. One might expect to find richer notions of normative inquiry in richer evolutionary models. A natural place to look would be in the context of evolutionary models that involve descriptive, predictive, and explanatory actions, where the inquirers' explanatory actions make use of their evolved descriptive resources. 15 While such models will invariably be more subtle and sophisticated than those discussed here, one should expect that a similar pragmatic notion of successful inquiry will be available there as well. 16 15 Tracking such explanatory dispositions would require a model that is significantly more subtle than anything considered in this paper. The evolution of explanatory dispositions might, for example, involve the evolution of dispositions to send signals that characterize the relationships between one's own first-and second-order dispositions to signal and predict and that may instill similar relations in the dispositions of other inquirers. 16 I would like to thank Brian Skyrms, Michael Dickson, Elliott Wagner, Simon Huttegger, Tucker Lentz, and the participants at the Stanford Workshop for helpful discussions. I would also
